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Abstract
Scholars have emphasized the potential of self-regulation, realized through ‘codes of good governance’, to improve gender 
diversity on boards. Yet, unconvinced of the effectiveness of this self-regulation, many regulators have implemented manda-
tory quota laws. Our study sheds light on this dilemma. Seeking to broaden our conceptual knowledge of how such ‘codes’ 
work in the specific case of gender diversity on boards, we ask: Under which conditions is self-regulation via voluntary 
principles of good governance effective? Expanding recent institutional-theory perspectives from the literature of women 
on boards, we show that, in the case of Austria, self-regulation via code recommendations is ineffective unless supported 
by additional forces. The primary reason for this, we argue, is that nominators do not expect benefits from gender-diverse 
boards. Furthermore, non-compliant companies face little pressure to change due to the small number of companies that 
have already adopted respective code recommendations. We identify two potential alternatives to boost the effectiveness of 
voluntary self-regulation for gender-diverse boards: First, the introduction of concrete targets for female representation and 
the public monitoring of fulfillment; and, second, the establishment of a credible threat that mandatory quotas will be imposed 
if diversity goals are not achieved. Drawing on longitudinal data from 2006 to 2016 on listed and state-owned companies 
in Austria, we give an empirical account of the conditions that assure effective self-regulation. Arguing that codes suffer 
from what we call ‘opportunity bias’, we conclude that political goals (such as gender equality) based on ethical rather than 
instrumental considerations are unlikely to be effectively implemented solely by codes of good governance.
Keywords Women on boards · Gender diversity · Codes of good governance · Self-regulation · Institutional theory
Introduction
Across the world, women remain a minority on corporate 
boards (Brieger et al. 2019; Carrasco et al. 2015; Grosvold 
et al. 2016). While a growing body of studies indicates some 
positive effects of gender-diverse boards on company per-
formance, it cannot be denied that, overall, the empirical 
evidence to date is inconclusive (for overviews see Adams 
et al. 2015; Kirsch 2017; Post and Byron 2015). Indeed, 
the slow rise in the number of female board members sug-
gests that nominators are unconvinced of the benefits of 
gender-balanced boards. Increasingly, gender diversity is 
positioned as an ethical issue of social justice and thus a 
matter to be addressed by political decision-makers (Euro-
pean Commission 2016; Ferreira 2015; Stein and van der 
Vlies 2014; World Economic Forum 2017). Affirming that 
the low proportion of women in top positions clearly con-
tradicts the democratic principle of equality, governments in 
various Western countries have constituted gender diversity 
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on boards as a political goal, promoting the introduction 
of gender diversity as a principle of corporate governance 
(Gabaldon et al. 2017b; Klettner et al. 2016; Terjesen et al. 
2015), enshrined in voluntary ‘codes of good governance’1 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004, 2009).
Since around 2004, national codes of good governance 
have increasingly come to feature provisions recommending 
that gender diversity should be considered when nominating 
directors (Gabaldon et al. 2017b). Voluntary by definition, 
these collections of best practices are implemented through 
self-regulation: Their comply-or-explain logic offers com-
panies the flexibility to either adopt recommended practices 
or explain why these are unsuitable for them (Boyd 1996; 
Klettner et al. 2016; Terjesen et al. 2015). Yet many gov-
ernments have recently withdrawn their support for codes, 
turning from self-regulation to coercive regulation via leg-
islative quotas (Labelle et al. 2015). By 2018, for example, 
nine European countries2 followed the example of Norway, 
a forerunner in this regard, in implementing mandatory quo-
tas (Mensi-Klarbach and Seierstad 2019). As their primary 
motivation, regulators argued that voluntary self-regulation 
had proven ineffective in raising gender diversity on boards 
(Grosvold et al. 2007; see also Deutscher Bundestag 2014).
The literature on women on boards, however, does not 
support the general assertion that self-regulation of gender 
diversity on boards is always ineffective (Sojo et al. 2016). 
On the contrary, empirical evidence indicates that volun-
tary approaches can successfully increase the proportion of 
female directors (European Women’s Lobby 2012; for Aus-
tralia, see Klettner et al. 2016; for the UK, see Doldor 2017). 
In addition, scholars even argue that, compared to legislative 
quotas, self-regulation is more likely to foster a cultural shift 
towards gender equality as well as to transform prevailing 
gender roles favoring men in board positions (Iannotta et al. 
2016; Klettner et al. 2016). While previous research sug-
gested that mandatory quotas could initiate cultural change 
(Wang and Kelan 2013), recent findings are more pessimis-
tic. For example, the quota in Norway was found to have 
“very little discernible impact on women in business beyond 
its direct effect on the women who made it into boardrooms” 
(Bertrand et al. 2019, p. 191). Moreover, mandatory quotas 
bear the risk of evoking strong resistance by companies, 
who may be inclined to follow “the letter rather than the 
spirit of the law” (Boyd 1996, p. 12), leading to the appoint-
ment of ‘token women’ (Du Plessis et al. 2014) as well as 
few ‘golden skirts’ (Seierstad and Opsahl 2011), i.e., women 
who acquire numerous board positions. Hence, we find here 
a basic contradiction: While scholars have emphasized the 
potential of self-regulation to improve gender diversity on 
boards, many regulators have turned to mandatory quotas in 
the belief that voluntary self-regulation has failed.
The aim of the current study is to shed light on this 
dilemma by broadening our conceptual knowledge of how 
voluntary codes impact gender diversity on boards. More 
specifically, we ask: Under which conditions is self-regu-
lation via principles of good governance effective? In our 
analysis we follow the example of recent studies in the schol-
arly field of women on boards by applying an institutional-
theory lens to the topic (Carrasco et al. 2015; Gregorič et al. 
2017; Grosvold et al. 2016; Perrault 2015; Terjesen et al. 
2015). We focus on two factors identified in the literature 
as driving the diffusion of new practices (Kennedy and Fiss 
2009) and argue that these also promote the adoption of 
practices recommended by codes: First, when companies 
are motivated by the perceived likelihood of benefits such as 
increased reputation, prestige, or profits; and second, when 
they respond to the perceived danger of losses incurred by 
non-adoption.
While gender diversity on boards is frequently mentioned 
in codes of good governance across the world (Gabaldon 
et al. 2017a, b), overall the numbers of female directors 
remain low. This indicates that nominators are skeptical of 
potential gains from gender-diverse boards and do not fear 
losses resulting from non-diverse boards. In addition, we 
argue that the overall number of adopters is too low to initi-
ate those pressures usually imposed by code mechanisms on 
remaining non-adopters. Therefore, our key point is that, due 
to the insufficient number of companies that expect benefits 
from adoption and hence (in complying with code recom-
mendations) initiate pressures on non-adopters, additional 
forces must be exploited to ensure the success of self-regula-
tion via codes. We suggest that code provisions can generate 
these forces by supplementing best-practice recommenda-
tions on gender diversity with measurable outcomes, i.e., 
targets for female representation and the public monitoring 
of fulfillment. Further, we assume that regulators can trigger 
additional pressures by threatening to legislate mandatory 
quotas.
Empirically, we focus on one particular institutional 
environment, namely the case of Austria, where voluntary 
self-regulation has taken different forms over time. Drawing 
on longitudinal data from 2005 to 2016 on listed and state-
owned companies, we test three hypotheses on the effects 
of self-regulation via voluntary codes on the proportion of 
female board members. Using a log-linear Poisson model, 
we find that code recommendations have indeed been inef-
fective in Austria unless supported by other forces. In par-
ticular, our analysis shows that the inclusion of specific tar-
gets for the proportion of female directors and the threat of 
1 We sometimes refer to ‘codes of good governance’ as ‘codes’ for 
better readability.
2 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain.
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legislated quotas can serve to pressurize nominators, result-
ing in more gender-diverse company boards.
Our study thus makes a threefold contribution to the lit-
erature on women on boards: First, by giving an empirical 
account of the conditions under which the self-regulation 
of gender diversity on boards via codes of good govern-
ance is effective. Second, we identify two potential ways 
of boosting the impact of voluntary self-regulation towards 
gender diversity on boards, and discuss the inherent limits 
and opportunities of these approaches. Third, and perhaps 
of greatest interest, we argue that codes of good govern-
ance suffer from what we call an ‘opportunity bias’, i.e., 
their underlying mechanisms require a sufficient number 
of companies to implement a practice because of expected 
gains, thereby triggering pressures on non-adopters. There-
fore, we conclude that political goals such as gender equality 
based on ethical rather than instrumental considerations are 
unlikely to be effectively implemented by codes alone.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: in 
the next section we outline the conceptual background to 
our research and develop our hypotheses. This is followed 
by a presentation of our study design, the Austrian case, as 
well as data, our method, and findings. Finally, we discuss 
these findings, reflect on implications for policy-making, and 
address limitations.
Conceptual Background and Hypotheses
Gender‑Diverse Boards and Codes of Good 
Governance
The self-regulation of gender diversity on boards is usu-
ally realized by means of voluntary codes of good govern-
ance (Gabaldon et al. 2017b). Early codes such as that pro-
posed by the UK’s Cadbury Report of 1992 were drawn 
up as a reaction to business scandals. Originally issued by 
representatives of the capital market to avoid managerial 
misuse of power, primarily at the expense of shareholders, 
codes recommend rules of best practice such as rejecting 
the duality of the offices of CEO and chairperson as well as 
emphasizing the supervisory role of non-executive direc-
tors (Boyd 1996). In the mid-2000s, when national codes 
of good governance had already spread around the globe 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2009), issuers started to add 
provisions to improve gender diversity on boards (Smith 
2014). Today a clear majority of codes includes recommen-
dations for the gender-diverse composition of boards (for 
Europe, see Gabaldon et al. 2017a, b). Codes usually allow 
for some degree of flexibility by applying the comply-or-
explain logic, which requires companies to publicly report 
on their compliance with code recommendations or state 
reasons for non-compliance (Seidl 2007).
Reasons for Compliance with Best‑Practice 
Recommendations
While a mandatory gender quota is clearly a coercive pres-
sure, voluntary self-regulation via codes draws on a differ-
ent mechanism. The classical institutional model of practice 
implementation suggests two separate rationales for organi-
zations to adopt practices (Tolbert and Zucker 1983): While 
early adopters follow an economic imperative, viewing the 
practice as technically effective (‘efficiency’), later adopters 
respond to the social imperative of ‘legitimacy’, i.e., they 
wish to comply with the expectations of their environments 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; see also Gregorič et al. 2017). 
More recent work, however, argues that such a segregation 
of economic and social logics is not only empirically dif-
ficult but also conceptually problematic as efficiency may 
be socially expected, thereby also representing a source of 
legitimacy (Höllerer 2013; Lounsbury 2007; Meyer 2004). 
At the same time, other scholars construe legitimacy as a 
key social resource granting access to economic resources 
and thus contributing to efficiency (Staw and Epstein 2000; 
see also Gregorič et al. 2017; Perrault 2015). Rethinking the 
classical model of practice implementation, Kennedy and 
Fiss (2009) claimed that early adopters are motivated by the 
perceived opportunity of achieving gains, whether economic 
or social, while later adopters respond to the perceived dan-
ger of incurring losses.
This latter concept, we argue, is also apt to explain what 
drives companies to follow best-practice recommendations 
in national codes of good governance. Initially, a few com-
panies comply because they interpret a recommended prac-
tice as an opportunity to achieve gains such as increased 
reputation, prestige, or profits. Later, more and more com-
panies adopt the practice because of pressures caused by the 
sheer number of complying companies. Such ‘bandwagon’ 
pressures, which were originally studied in the diffusion 
of management fashions, arise from a sufficient number of 
early adopters (‘adoption threshold’) triggering a positive 
feedback loop: “[I]ncreases in the number of adopters raise 
bandwagon pressures, and raised bandwagon pressures cause 
the number of adopters to grow” (Abrahamson and Rosen-
kopf 1993, p. 488). Clearly, non-adopters wish to avoid 
competitive disadvantages due to their non-compliance. This 
mechanism, in particular, we further argue, links to what 
has been identified as key to the effectiveness of voluntary 
self-regulation by drawing on the underlying motivation for 
compliance of later adopters, which is “assumed to be the 
fear of public exposure and criticism of firms that deviate 
from the code” (Boyd 1996, p. 172).
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Self‑Regulation via Codes Alone is Ineffective
Despite mixed evidence on their economic effects (Adams 
et al. 2015; Kirsch 2017; Post and Byron 2015), scholars 
have argued that business environments are increasingly in 
favor of gender-diverse boards (Terjesen et al. 2009), with 
most actors now decrying “the lack of legitimacy of homo-
philous (e.g., all-male) boards” (Perrault 2015, p. 149). 
Literature on women on boards also highlights the societal 
demand for gender equality and the political goal of gen-
der-diverse boards as external pressures that can potentially 
shape the nomination practices of organizations (Gregorič 
et al. 2017). Nevertheless, the proportion of female directors 
has generally remained low in many countries (Brieger et al. 
2019; Carrasco et al. 2015; Grosvold et al. 2016).
From a conceptual perspective, we thus conclude that 
nominators hardly expect gains from gender-diverse boards, 
even if recommended by codes of good governance. The 
number of companies that follow respective code recom-
mendations fails to meet the adoption threshold, and hence 
is too low to trigger bandwagon pressures on non-adopters. 
Thus, we can formulate our first hypothesis as follows:
(H1) Voluntary self-regulation of gender diversity on 
boards that solely draws on recommendations in codes 
of good governance will not be effective in increasing 
the proportion of female directors.
In the absence of a sufficient number of adopters perceiv-
ing self-regulation as an opportunity to achieve gains and 
thus initiating bandwagon pressures on non-adopters, we 
argue that self-regulation via codes must exploit additional 
forces to be effective. Echoing recent voices in the debate 
on women on boards skeptical of whether societal demands 
alone were sufficiently powerful to raise gender diversity 
(e.g., Gregorič et al. 2017), we deny that code provisions 
alone can increase female representation in higher echelons. 
At the same time, we argue that voluntary self-regulation 
can still be effective when additional forces place pressures 
on non-adopters.
A Focus on Specific Outcomes Triggers Pressures
Arguing for ‘radical’ solutions in the implementation of 
policies, scholars have previously suggested moving away 
from a procedural focus on recommended practices to a 
results-oriented perspective (Jewson and Mason 1986). 
This idea is aligned with the basic control philosophy of 
management, which holds that objectives must be measur-
able and specific in order to be achieved (Drucker 1954). 
There is no doubt that provisions within codes usually sug-
gest practices in a rather procedural way (e.g., board election 
procedures, information flow between board and manage-
ment) unrelated to specific outcomes. In this respect, gender 
diversity provisions differ from most other code recommen-
dations, whereby altered nomination practices should result 
in changed board compositions. While compliance in terms 
of gender diversity is easily measurable, i.e., a higher ratio 
of female directors, most codes do not address this, prefer-
ring to remain unspecific about targeted outcomes: They 
adopt vague formulations such as that gender diversity 
should be ‘considered appropriately’ in the nomination of 
board members (Mensi-Klarbach 2017). Such ambiguous 
language in regulatory provisions serves to hamper equality 
by encouraging divergent interpretations of the meaning of 
‘diversity’ in relation to boards (Edelman 2016). Recom-
mendations remain ‘incomplete’ in that they do not provide 
a clear standard as point of reference to evaluate and pub-
licly monitor compliant or deviant behavior by companies 
(Klettner et al. 2016; Seidl 2007).
The beneficial effect of target-setting has long been recog-
nized in the management literature, perhaps most famously 
formulated in goal-setting theory (Locke 1968; Locke and 
Latham 2002). The underlying assumption of this theory is 
that “goals direct attention, effort, and persistence towards 
a goal-relevant outcome” (Wood et al. 2013, p. 91). In addi-
tion, it implies that improvements in the goal-relevant out-
come are most likely when goals are not only specific but 
also complemented by feedback on goal attainment (Ash-
ford and De Stobbeleir 2013; see also Mento et al. 1987). 
Recently, scholars have argued that the idea of goal setting, 
i.e., defining “a standard of expected achievement on a spe-
cific criterion”, also underlies the definition of targets for 
female representation on boards, which “focus attention 
and accountability on outcomes” (Sojo et al. 2016, p. 520). 
This argument implies that goal-setting theory, originally 
centered on the motivation of individuals to perform bet-
ter (Locke and Latham 2013), can also be applied to the 
field-level goals of organizations. The UK example indicates 
that such an approach may be effective: Here an independ-
ent committee sets targets for gender diversity on boards in 
addition to code recommendations and publicly reports on 
companies’ progress (Davies Review 2011–2015; Hampton-
Alexander Review since 2016, see Doldor 2017).
Drawing on this assertion, we argue that the establishment 
of targets for gender diversity on boards imposes pressures 
on companies to adopt respective code recommendations. 
The setting of clearly defined standards reduces interpreta-
tive discretion when assessing companies’ voluntary compli-
ance with the otherwise abstract goal of gender diversity. In 
addition, public monitoring of companies’ progress serves 
as a feedback mechanism to identify compliant and devi-
ant behavior of companies in a binary hit-or-miss logic. 
Therefore, we expect that supplementing vague best-prac-
tice recommendations on gender diversity with measurable 
outcomes and feedback on their fulfillment will generate 
additional pressures on nominators to appoint more women. 
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Companies view public criticism of their non-compliance as 
a potential loss. We thus hypothesize that:
(H2) Voluntary self-regulation of gender diversity on 
boards that draws on recommendations in codes of 
good governance as well as specific targets for out-
comes and their public monitoring will be effective in 
increasing the ratio of female directors.
The ‘Shadow of Hierarchy’ Triggers Pressures
Self-regulation essentially draws on the idea of voluntary 
collaboration rather than coercion (Hart 2010). In attempt-
ing to distinguish voluntary self-regulation from legislative 
regulation, the governance literature has identified ‘coopera-
tion’ and ‘hierarchy’ as alternative regulatory modes (Rho-
des 1996; Scharpf 1997). Whereas hierarchy is based on 
coercive enforcement via laws and directives, cooperation 
involves bargaining among involved actors and, in particu-
lar, provides the option of non-compliance. While codes of 
corporate governance are clearly oriented on the latter mode, 
they have also been regarded “as an attempt to maintain a 
system of self-regulation in the face of the threat of legis-
lated control” (Boyd 1996, p. 172, italics added). Thus com-
panies’ motivation for voluntary compliance with codes is 
neither derived from the imposition of legislative authority 
nor from its total absence, but from the potential imposition 
of regulatory authority and the wish to avoid this outcome 
(Börzel 2008; Mayntz 2006; Schuppert 2007). Voluntary 
adoption, therefore, happens under the condition of potential 
rather than actual coercion. Such voluntary cooperation by 
companies under a considerable degree of potential legisla-
tive coercion has been described as acting under the ‘shadow 
of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1997; see also Peters and Pierre 2016; 
Steurer 2013). In particular, this topic has been discussed 
within the public-policy literature on multilevel governance 
in the European Union (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008).
Regarding gender diversity on boards, we now draw on 
research from other countries, namely Sweden (Bohman 
et al. 2012), France (Singh et al. 2015), Australia (Klettner 
et al. 2016), as well as the UK (Grosvold et al. 2007; Sealy 
and Vinnicombe 2013), arguing that the emergence of a 
threat due to regulators’ public sympathizing with legislative 
board quotas has a positive effect on female representation. 
We suggest that in such particular cases of self-regulation 
under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, the mere threat of the 
regulator’s “interference in what [companies] considered 
strictly business issues” (Bohman et al. 2012, pp. 94–95) 
places considerable pressures on nominators. The retention 
of non-diverse boards may result in the regulator imposing 
mandatory board quotas. We argue, however, that companies 
try to signal that a shift to mandatory board quotas is unnec-
essary and that self-regulatory forces (instigated by codes) 
are sufficient. It can be assumed that the regulator’s threat 
to legislate mandatory quotas triggers additional pressures 
on nominators to appoint more women, as such legislation 
would result in a partial or complete loss of companies’ dis-
cretionary freedoms. This leads to our third hypothesis:
(H3) Voluntary self-regulation of gender diversity 
on boards under the threat that the regulator might 
implement a legislative board quota will be effective 
in increasing the ratio of female directors.
Empirical Setting: The Case of Austria
The history of voluntary self-regulation of gender diversity 
on Austrian boards started in 2008 when the country’s code 
of corporate governance recommended for the first time that 
appropriate consideration be given to gender diversity in 
[supervisory3] board nominations (Rule 42). The Austrian 
code was originally drawn up in 2002 by various representa-
tives of the capital market such as listed firms, investors, 
the Vienna Stock Exchange, and the Austrian Institute of 
Auditors (Schenz and Eberhartinger 2002). From 2004 the 
Vienna Stock Exchange required all companies listed on its 
prime market to subscribe to the comply-or-explain principle 
and to publish an annual report on corporate governance. In 
2008 the Austrian parliament codified these requirements in 
the Austrian Commercial Act (Article 243b). Subsequently, 
listed companies have been legally required to publish 
annual corporate governance reports. Compliance with code 
recommendations, however, remains voluntary.
In the 2000s gender provisions were implemented in 
national codes of corporate governance in many other Euro-
pean countries (Gabaldon et al. 2017a, b). Mandatory quo-
tas also gained momentum in the late 2000s when several 
European regulators followed the example of Norway, the 
pioneer in this regard (Seierstad et al. 2017; Terjesen et al. 
2015). In 2010 the European Commission announced the 
development of an EU-wide regulation of gender diversity 
on boards. The Commission’s Vice-President, Viviane Red-
ing, said that, since all calls for voluntary self-regulation 
had failed to deliver, the commission was prepared to intro-
duce mandatory quotas (European Commission 2010). In 
2011 the European Parliament endorsed this approach in a 
resolution on the issue (European Parliament 2011); and in 
2012 the Commission published a draft directive (European 
Commission 2012). Although this initiative did not in fact 
lead to any further legislative steps, these developments at 
the European level contributed to the lively public debate on 
3 Austria follows the German approach of a two-tier board system 
(executive and supervisory boards: Doralt et al. 2012; see also Davies 
2000).
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how to achieve gender diversity on boards. Intense media 
coverage placed considerable pressure on companies as well 
as national regulators to decide whether to stick to voluntary 
self-regulation or turn to mandatory board quotas.
From 2010 the Austrian Federal Minister for Women 
and the Civil Service, Gabriele Heinisch-Hosek, began to 
argue for the introduction of specific targets in the Austrian 
code recommendation on gender diversity on boards. At the 
height of heated EU-wide discussions on the implementa-
tion of mandatory board quotas, she courted controversy in 
Austria by announcing the implementation of mandatory 
quotas if voluntary self-regulation proved insufficient.4 As a 
reaction to the code issuers’ decision in 2012 not to include 
any targets in their revised code, the regulator withdrew sup-
port for the self-regulation of gender diversity on boards, 
imposing a legal requirement in the Austrian Corporate Act 
(Article 87) that gender diversity be appropriately consid-
ered. However, the regulator stopped short of introducing 
mandatory quotas for listed companies and continued with 
the vague formulation of the relevant provision
Parallel to these developments, in 2012 the Austrian gov-
ernment established a voluntary regulatory framework for 
state-owned companies and implemented a ‘public’ code 
of good governance (Bundeskanzleramt 2012), which rec-
ommended working to achieve gender equality on super-
visory boards (Rule 11.2.1.2). In addition, the government 
required state-owned companies to publish annual corporate 
governance reports clearly indicating the ratio of women on 
supervisory boards as well as to subscribe to the comply-
or-explain principle. One year earlier, the government had 
committed itself to voluntary targets for female representa-
tion on the supervisory boards of all state-owned compa-
nies, namely 25% by 2013 and 35% by 2018 (Österreichische 
Bundesregierung 2011). To document progress made, since 
2012 the government has published the ratios of women on 
these supervisory boards.
Method
Data
Sample
Our sample consists of the full population of Austrian com-
panies that took part in voluntary self-regulation to increase 
gender diversity on boards. More precisely, we focus on two 
separate sets of companies: first, companies listed on the 
prime market of the Vienna Stock Exchange, which were 
addressed by recommendations of the Austrian code; and 
second, state-owned companies in which the Federal Repub-
lic of Austria holds a direct share of at least 50%, which were 
addressed by the Austrian ‘public’ code as well as the gov-
ernment’s voluntary commitment to specific targets. Draw-
ing on the Austrian commercial register, we collected data 
for the years 2006 to 2016 on supervisory-board members 
as well as companies. Our sample includes 65 listed com-
panies (439 years in total) and 61 state-owned companies 
(527 years in total).5
Models
In a first set of models, we separately examined the main 
effects of Recommendation and Threat on listed companies 
and Targets on state-owned companies regarding the propor-
tion of female board members while taking account of Year, 
Board size and Company size, average Board tenure and 
whether the industry to which a respective company belongs 
has an employment base of more than 50% women (‘Female’ 
industry). In a second set of models, we explored potential 
interaction effects between these control variables and the 
three self-regulations, including the level of State ownership 
for state-owned companies (see below for detailed descrip-
tions of each variable operationalization).
Dependent Variable
Our study investigates the conditions under which volun-
tary self-regulation of gender diversity on boards via code 
recommendations may be effective. We argue that addi-
tional forces are required to amplify existing, yet limited, 
legitimacy pressures in order to render self-regulation effec-
tive, and that these forces vary between different periods of 
self-regulation. Similar to Gregorič et al. (2017; following 
Ingram and Simons 1995), we argue that the effectiveness 
of voluntary self-regulation can be measured by an increase 
in that which is demanded, i.e., a gender-diverse board com-
position. Specifically, our dependent variable is the propor-
tion of female supervisory-board members (see also Perrault 
2015), i.e., the number of female board members divided by 
5 The fact that the number of years is here lower than the number of 
companies multiplied by the 11 years of the observation period 2006–
2016 can be attributed to changes in the sets of companies (e.g., later 
listings, de-listings, mergers, and insolvencies of listed companies, 
especially after 2008; also the establishment and dissolution of state-
owned companies or changes in the percentage of the government’s 
stake in these companies).
4 137 newspaper articles on this issue were published from 2010 
to 2012 by the leading Austrian newspapers Der Standard and Die 
Presse (see method section). For example, on April 16, 2010, the 
minister is quoted as saying that she does not see how a voluntary 
approach can work: “In the year 2010, women don’t get appointed to 
top management positions unless it suits the men” (authors’ transla-
tion).
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the total number of board members in a given company and 
year (shareholder representatives only6).
Explanatory Variables
We measure the effect of voluntary self-regulation by com-
paring the proportions of female board members before and 
after implementation (similar to the approach of Sojo et al. 
2016), while accounting for the linear trend during the whole 
relevant period (see below).
Recommendation To test the effectiveness of self-regula-
tion based solely on the Austrian code recommendation for 
gender diversity introduced in 2008, we measure the change 
in the proportion of female board members in listed com-
panies in the periods after (2009–2010) and before (2006–
2008) implementation of this form of self-regulation.
Targets Self-regulation via code recommendation, supple-
mented by specific targets for outcomes and public monitoring 
of fulfillment, was imposed on state-owned companies in 2011. 
To test the effectiveness of this approach, we compare changes 
in the proportion of female board members in state-owned 
companies in the period 2011–2016 (after the introduction of 
voluntary targets) with the preceding period 2006–2010.
Threat To test the effect of the threat that the government 
might introduce a mandatory quota, we examine changes in 
the proportion of female board members in listed compa-
nies in a period when public debate on the implementation 
of mandatory quotas was exceptionally intense. We conceive 
this threat as the heated debate on quota implementation con-
ducted in Austria’s two leading quality newspapers, one of 
which is politically left-of-center and the other right-of-center 
(see “Appendix 1”). Accordingly, we compare changes in the 
proportion of female board members in listed companies 
in the period of 2011–2012, when public discussions were 
exceptionally lively, with the previous period 2009–2010, 
which was before the EU Commission and the Austrian gov-
ernment expressed interest in mandatory quotas.
Control variables
Previous research has shown that the effect of self-regu-
lation via codes is potentially confounded with a general 
trend towards increased female representation on boards. 
For this reason, we include Year as a covariate (Sojo et al. 
2016). In addition, we consider several company-related 
variables: First, we control for Board size, i.e., the total num-
ber of shareholder representatives on supervisory boards, 
as the percentage of women on boards has been found to 
be positively correlated with this variable (Terjesen et al. 
2009). We also control for Company size (i.e., the num-
ber of employees, logarithmized to reduce the influence 
of outliers), which is mentioned as a potential determinant 
of gender diversity on boards, indicating a positive rela-
tion between firm size and female representation on boards 
(Grosvold et al. 2007; Hillman et al. 2007). At industry level, 
we control for whether a respective company belongs to a 
‘Female’ industry, i.e., where more than 50% of the work-
force is female, as firms operating in such sectors are more 
likely to have gender-diverse boards (Hillman et al. 2007).7 
We also control for the average length of Board tenure (as 
of 2016), as longer tenure implies lower turnover and thus 
slower progress towards gender diversity. Finally, we control 
for the degree of State ownership in the set of state-owned 
companies, assuming that nominations by state agencies are 
more likely to be affected by the government’s commitment 
to gender-diverse boards than those by other co-owners. This 
variable is divided into three categories, i.e., minimum own-
ership of 50% as reference category; > 50–75% ownership; 
> 75–100% ownership.
Data Analysis
Our analyses had to take two factors into account. First, 
as our observations consist of multilevel data (i.e., years 
nested within companies), we could not rely on an analytical 
method that assumes independent data such as OLS regres-
sion. Second, direct calculation of the proportion of female 
board members for each year would result in a criterion 
variable that is extremely skewed, zero-inflated (40% of all 
cases), and severely affected by outliers. Thus we adopted 
a generalized estimating equation (Zeger and Liang 1986) 
log-linear Poisson model with year as repeated level 1 effect 
within companies as level 2 units (exchangeable correlation 
structure and robust covariance matrix estimator; Williams 
2000). While the immediate outcome variable is the number 
of female supervisory-board members (shareholder repre-
sentatives only), we used the logarithm of the total number 
6 Under Austrian law, companies must implement a two-tier board 
system (see footnote 1) and adopt the principle of codetermination, 
i.e., participation of employee representatives in supervisory boards 
(Doralt et  al. 2012; see also Davies 2000). However, Austrian code 
provisions for gender diversity only address shareholder representa-
tives on supervisory boards (for a similar empirical context, see 
Gregorič et al. 2017).
7 We identified these industries based on data published by the Main 
Association of Austrian Social Security Institutions (Sozialversi-
cherung 2016), which follows the NACE categorization system of 
the European Union: accommodation and food service activities; real 
estate activities; professional, scientific and technical activities; pub-
lic administration and defense; compulsory social security; education, 
human health and social work activities.
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of board members as a so-called ‘offset variable’ to enable 
us to model the dependent variable reported above, i.e., the 
proportion (rather than the number) of female board mem-
bers (Agresti 2007, p. 82).
We tested our hypotheses by examining the effect of a 
dichotomous variable representing the periods before and 
after implementation of self-regulation on the proportion 
of female board members (2009–2010 vs. 2006–2008 for 
Recommendation and 2011–2012 vs. 2009–2010 for Threat, 
based on listed companies; 2011–2016 vs. 2006–2010 for 
Targets, based on state-owned companies) while also taking 
account of the linear trend and the abovementioned control 
variables. The proportion of female board members is thus 
modeled with the following predictors: The periods before 
and after introducing self-regulation, Year, the number of 
board members (Board size), the (logarithmized) number of 
employees (Company size), average Board tenure (i.e., how 
many years on average members have been on the board), 
and whether the company operates in an industry with more 
than 50% female employees (‘Female’ industry).
In addition to these main effect models, we calculated a 
second set of models to investigate the interactions between 
self-regulations and the control variables. Additional analy-
ses included a comparison of the estimates of Recommen-
dation, Targets, and Threat with the level 2 variable (i.e., 
company) as a random effect to those with company as a 
fixed effect. In addition to being a check of model robust-
ness (i.e., whether the identified effects of the measures still 
apply in the fixed effect models), this comparison also helps 
detecting model misspecifications and potential endogene-
ity problems (Hausman test, e.g., Antonakis et al. 2010, p. 
1093). Given that logistic rather than linear models were 
applied, a Chi square statistic (with one degree of freedom) 
was calculated by dividing the squared difference between 
the estimators for fixed and random effects models by the 
difference between the respective squared standard errors 
(Staub 2009, p. 1838). The statistical models were calculated 
using the software IBM SPSS Statistics 20. All continuous 
predictors were grand-mean centered before conducting 
the analyses. One limitation to our analysis is that the main 
predictor relies on a comparison of time periods. Another 
limitation is that our control variables do not include demo-
graphic attributes of nominators that may also influence the 
effectiveness of voluntary self-regulation for gender diver-
sity on boards. Including attributes of supervisory-board 
members could have partly accounted for such an effect, as 
the supervisory board may propose candidates even if their 
nomination is a task to be performed by the general meeting 
of shareholders. Further, as with most observational studies 
on the implementation of a specific measure, there is no 
counterfactual setting to assess the measure’s effect more 
precisely and reliably.
Findings
The following table (Table 1) shows the descriptives and 
intercorrelations for all variables used in the analyses for 
state-owned as well as listed companies. For illustrative 
purposes we also include the proportion of female board 
members calculated directly.
The following graphs (Fig. 1) show the development 
of the proportion of female board members in listed and 
state-owned companies. The bars represent the value range 
between the first and third quartile (i.e., the middle 50% of 
the sample), while the large darker dots represent the mean 
values for the respective year.
Previous studies have revealed within-country differences 
in gender diversity on boards, with diversity being higher in 
the public than in the private sector (Brieger et al. 2019; Du 
Plessis et al. 2014; Terjesen et al. 2009). We find a similar 
pattern in our data: Fig. 1 shows that average levels and 
linear trends of the ratio of women on boards differ between 
listed and state-owned companies. Such disparities have 
been explained by asserting that the presence of women in 
top positions reflects awareness of and responsiveness to 
wider social issues (Kelan 2008; Wang and Kelan 2013). 
The main argument here is that the ethos in the public sec-
tor is generally more receptive to social issues than in the 
private sector, and therefore also to gender equality (Brieger 
et al. 2019). Another explanation emphasizes variations in 
sub-national regulatory policies (Terjesen et al. 2009; Thams 
et al. 2018). Austria’s Federal Equal Treatment Act initiated 
measures to support women at all levels of the civil service 
(Gresch and Sauer 2018), leading to less vertical and hori-
zontal gender segregation in the public sector compared to 
private businesses. However, the act is only applicable to 
civil service jobs and does not cover state-owned companies. 
Nevertheless, we attribute the higher level of gender equal-
ity and positive trend in the ratio of women on the boards 
of state-owned compared to private companies to a moder-
ate spillover effect from the Federal Equal Treatment Act. 
Due to these differences and the fact that the self-regulation 
measures are specific to the respective sets of companies, we 
analyze the two sets separately.
The following tables (Tables 2, 3, and 4) present the results 
of the repeated-measures Poisson regressions for the various 
predictors of female representation. In addition to the param-
eter estimates and standard errors for the predictors, the tables 
give the exponentiated regression coefficients (with 95% con-
fidence interval), which represent the estimated multiplicative 
effect of the predictor on the proportion of female board mem-
bers. Here a parameter estimate of 2 implies that (keeping the 
other predictors constant) a one-unit increase in the predictor 
(the reported period after implementation compared to the 
period before) doubles the estimated proportion of female 
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board members. Likewise, an estimate of .5 means that the 
proportion of female directors is halved.  
There is no evidence for a positive effect of Recommen-
dations. The results even indicate an insignificant nega-
tive effect (more so in smaller companies, as evidenced 
in the marginally significant interaction with board size). 
Looking at the range of estimated effects of Recommenda-
tions covered by the 95% confidence interval, the upper 
bound translates into a small correlational effect of .11 
(Bonett 2007, p. 255). Therefore, while the confidence inter-
val extends slightly into the positive range, the results are 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations
Spearman rank correlations; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
a n = 439, except for Recommendation (237), Threat (157), Company size (399)
b n = 527, except for Company size (445)
Listed  companiesa Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1. % female directors 8.77 12.54
2. n female directors 0.67 0.92 0.97**
3. Recommendation 0.35 0.48 0.03 0.05
4. Targets n/a n/a – – –
5. Threat 0.47 0.50 0.24** 0.23** – –
6. Year 2010.4 3.07 0.33** 0.36** 0.84** – 0.89**
7. Board size 7.58 2.93 0.13** 0.27** 0.07 – 0.06 0.16**
8. Company size 8.13 1.82 − 0.04 0.05 0.06 – 0.06 0.13** 0.46**
9. Board tenure 11.22 3.63 − 0.28** − 0.30** − 0.27** – − 0.35** − 0.69** − 0.16** 0.03
10. ‘Female’ industry 0.47 .50 − 0.04 − 0.04 0.03 – 0.04 0.07 − 0.02 0.10 − 0.02
State-owned  companiesb Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
1. % female directors 22.53 19.45
2. n female directors 1.70 1.55 0.90**
3. Recommendation n/a n/a – –
4. Targets 0.58 .49 0.46** 0.36** –
5. Threat n/a n/a – – – –
6. Year 2011.2 3.07 0.50** 0.38** – 0.86** –
7. Board size 7.47 2.98 0.09 * 0.45** – − 0.07 – − 0.11 *
8. Company size 4.76 2.07 0.11 * 0.20** – − 0.07 – − 0.09 0.27**
9. Board tenure 9.92 3.49 − 0.39** − 0.32** – − 0.67** – − 0.77** 0.02 0.06
10. ‘Female’ industry 0.50 0.50 0.13** 0.14** – − 0.01 – − 0.01 0.06 0.02 − 0.08
Listed companies  State-owned companies 
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Fig. 1  Development of proportion of female board members in both samples
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largely in accordance with H1, negating a positive impact 
of Recommendations on gender diversity on boards.
Unlike Recommendations and in accordance with H2, 
Targets raise the proportion of female board members by an 
estimated factor of 1.4 even when the linear upward trend 
is accounted for. According to the results for model 2, this 
effect is strongest in companies with a high degree of public 
ownership (and weakest in companies with larger boards).
The results also show Threat as having a positive effect 
on the proportion of female board members (albeit less so 
in larger companies and/or boards with higher average ten-
ure), supporting H3. On average, Threat increases the pro-
portion of female board members by an estimated factor of 
1.5, which is comparable to Targets. In addition, we found 
that after 2012, when the code provisions were included 
in an amendment to the Austrian Company Law but with-
out mentioning any quotas, the threat of implementing a 
Table 2  Results for recommendation
† p < 0.10 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
n (level 1, level 2): 215 years, 58 companies
a 2009–2010 versus 2006–2008, listed companies
Model 1 (main effects) Model 2 (incl. interaction effects)
B (s.e.) Exp(B) (95% CI) B (s.e.) Exp(B) (95% CI)
Constant − 2.75 (0.34)** 0.06 (0.03… 0.13) − 2.99 (0.48)** 0.05 (0.02… 0.13)
Recommendationa − 0.03 (0.16) 0.97 (0.71… 1.33) − 0.23 (0.49) 0.79 (0.31… 2.06)
Year 0.14 (0.07) * 1.15 (1.01… 1.31) 0.15 (0.06)** 1.16 (1.04… 1.30)
Board size 0.04 (0.03) 1.04 (0.98… 1.12) 0.04 (0.03) 1.04 (0.98… 1.11)
Company size − 0.04 (0.11) 0.96 (0.78… 1.18) − 0.03 (0.10) 0.97 (0.79… 1.19)
Board tenure 0.07 (0.04)† 1.07 (0.99… 1.15) 0.12 (0.06) 1.13 (1.01… 1.26)
‘Female’ industry 0.06 (0.39) 1.06 (0.49… 2.30) 0.24 (0.48) 1.28 (0.50… 3.24)
Recommendation × board size 0.05 (0.03)† 1.05 (1.00… 1.10)
Recommendation × company size 0.05 (0.06) 1.05 (0.93… 1.18)
Recommendation × board tenure − 0.02 (0.06) 0.98 (0.88… 1.09)
Recommendation × ‘female’ industry 0.18 (27) 1.20 (0.70… 2.04)
Table 3  Results for targets
† p < 0.10 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
n (level 1, level 2): 445/440 years, 59 companies
a 2011–2016 versus 2006–2010, state-owned companies
Model 1 (main effects) Model 2 (incl. interaction effects)
B (s.e.) Exp(B) (95% CI) B (s.e.) Exp(B) (95% CI)
Constant − 1.91 (0.16)** 0.15 (0.11… 0.20) − 1.21 (0.40)** 0.30 (0.14… 0.65)
Targetsa 0.33 (0.09)** 1.39 (1.16… 1.66) − 0.28 (0.36) 0.76 (0.38… 1.52)
Year 0.07 (0.03)** 1.07 (1.02… 1.13) 0.07 (0.03)** 1.07 (1.02… 1.13)
Board size − 0.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.97… 1.03) 0.03 (0.02) 1.03 (0.99… 1.06)
Company size − 0.02 (0.04) 0.98 (0.91… 1.06) 0.04 (0.07) 1.04 (0.90… 1.19)
Board tenure − 0.04 (0.03)† 0.96 (0.91… 1.01) − 0.08 (0.05) 0.93 (0.83… 1.03)
“Female” industry 0.15 (0.17) 1.17 (0.84… 1.62) 0.33 (0.23) 1.39 (0.89… 2.16)
State ownership 75 + to 100% − 0.80 (0.32)* 0.45 (0.24… 0.84)
State ownership 50 + to 75% − 0.78 (0.49) 0.46 (0.18… 1.19)
Targets × board size − 0.03 (0.02)* 0.97 (0.94… 1.00)
Targets × company size − 0.05 (0.06) 0.95 (0.85… 1.06)
Targets × board tenure 0.04 (0.05) 1.04 (0.94… 1.15)
Targets × ‘female’ industry − 0.10 (0.19) 0.90 (0.62… 1.32)
Targets × state ownership 75 + to 100% 0.70 (0.28)* 2.02 (1.17… 3.49)
Targets × state ownership 50 + to 75% 0.48 (0.46) 1.62 (0.65… 4.01)
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mandatory quota and its effect on the proportion of female 
directors had disappeared. Once the voluntary code provi-
sion was replaced by an unspecific legal prescription, the 
media discourse on a mandatory quota faded and expectation 
fell that such as quota law would be introduced. Comparing 
the period 2013–2016 to the Threat period (2011–2012), our 
data shows the exponentiated regression coefficient (with the 
same control variables as in all other models) for the ‘post-
threat’ period to be .98 (.85… 1.13), ns; the effect for year 
is 1.1 (1.01… 1.19), p < .05.
Poisson regression assumes mean and variance of the 
dependent count variable to be equal (see Coxe et al. 2009, p. 
123). The observed variance-to-mean ratio for female board 
members in the models presented above is 1.5 for Targets 
and 1.2 for Recommendations and Threat, indicating a cer-
tain but not serious degree of overdispersion. In addition to 
using robust standard errors in the models presented above, 
we duplicated the analyses using a negative binomial dis-
tribution with virtually the same results and identical con-
clusions. Likewise, while the correlations between year and 
the self-regulations are considerable (see Table 1), the VIF 
values for all predictors are well below the commonly cited 
threshold of 10 (e.g., Wooldridge 2009, p. 99). Regarding 
the Hausman test mentioned in the section on data analysis, 
a comparison of the estimates of the three self-regulations 
with the level 2 variable (i.e., company) as a random effect 
to those with company as a fixed effect endorses the random 
effect models in all cases and does not indicate misspeci-
fication and/or endogeneity issues for the results presented 
above. Finally, we examined the effects of Recommendations, 
Targets, and Threat under the assumption that the regulations 
take effect with a delay of one year (i.e., 2010 vs. 2006–2008 
for Recommendations, 2012–2016 vs. 2006–2010 for Targets, 
2012 vs. 2009–2010 for Threat). Again, the estimates of the 
regulation effects lead to the same conclusions (for the results 
of all additional analyses, see “Appendix 2”).
Discussion
Our findings indicate that self-regulation of gender diversity 
on boards is ineffective if merely based on recommendations 
in codes of good governance. Nominators appear skeptical 
of gains from gender-diverse boards, which also indicates 
that the overall societal demand for gender equality is too 
low to reward the abandonment of prevailing male-oriented 
nomination practices. Nevertheless, we found evidence for 
the effectiveness of self-regulation via code recommenda-
tions under particular conditions: Even in the absence of a 
sufficient number of early adopters to initiate pressures on 
non-adopters, self-regulation was effective when additional 
forces for compliance could be triggered. In the case of Aus-
tria, we showed that the threat of the regulator introducing 
mandatory quotas could reinforce nominators’ motivation to 
comply, leading to an increased proportion of female direc-
tors in listed companies. We also found that for state-owned 
companies, self-regulation via a code recommendation was 
effective when supplemented by specific targets for out-
comes and the public monitoring of fulfillment.
In the following subsections, we discuss conceptual as 
well as policy implications, and reflect on the limitations of 
our study as well as avenues for further research.
‘Opportunity Bias’ of Codes Limits Potential 
for Gender‑Diverse Boards
Drawing on literature from institutional theory (Kennedy 
and Fiss 2009), we have argued that companies comply with 
Table 4  Results for threat
† p < 0.10 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
n (level 1, level 2): 153 years, 46 companies
a 2011–2012 versus 2009–2010, listed companies
Model 1 (main effects) Model 2 (incl. interaction effects)
B (s.e.) Exp(B) (95% CI) B (s.e.) Exp(B) (95% CI)
Constant − 2.30 (0.29)** 0.10 (0.06… 0.18) − 2.80 (0.40)** 0.06 (0.03… 0.13)
Threata 0.40 (0.17)* 1.49 (1.06… 2.10) 0.99 (0.33)** 2.69 (1.42… 5.12)
Year − 0.05 (0.08) 0.95 (0.82… 1.11) − 0.01 (0.07) 0.99 (0.87… 1.13)
Board size − 0.04 (0.03) 0.96 (0.91… 1.02) − 0.04 (0.02)† 0.96 (0.93… 1.00)
Company size − 0.04 (0.11) 0.97 (0.78… 1.20) 0.20 (0.14) 1.22 (0.93… 1.61)
Board tenure − 0.17 (0.07)* 0.85 (0.73… 0.98) − 0.04 (0.05) 0.96 (0.87… 1.05)
‘Female’ industry − 0.64 (0.42) 0.53 (0.23… 1.20) − 0.82 (0.49)† 0.44 (0.17… 1.15)
Threat × board size 0.02 (0.03) 1.02 (0.96… 1.08)
Threat × company size − 0.22 (0.10)* 0.80 (0.65… 0.98)
Threat × board tenure − 0.12 (0.05)* 0.89 (0.81… 0.98)
Threat × ‘female’ industry − 0.00 (0.36) 1.00 (0.49… 2.02)
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code recommendations either because of expected benefits 
or the perceived danger associated with non-adoption. Yet 
our data shows that codes of good governance alone were 
insufficient to effectively promote gender-diverse boards.
Therefore, codes of good governance are not an apt means 
to implement gender-diverse boards unless supported by 
other forces. We believe that this can be explained by the 
mechanism underlying codes, which draws on a positive 
feedback loop initiated by early adopters causing bandwagon 
pressures on later adopters (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 
1993). Deviating companies then respond to those pressures 
as they do not wish to suffer competitive disadvantage from 
public exposure or blame for deviating from a code recom-
mendation (Boyd 1996). Yet in our case, the number of early 
adopters failed to meet the adoption threshold.
For codes to be effective, a sufficient number of early 
adopters is required to initiate bandwagon pressures, which 
then increases with the number of adopters. However, in 
contrast to later adopters, who wish to avoid losses incurred 
by such pressures, early adopters need to be motivated by 
expected gains. Yet while gender equality may be societally 
demanded and, hence, socially expected to a certain extent 
(Perrault 2015; Terjesen et al. 2009), very few nominators 
expect to enjoy specific benefits from gender-diverse boards.
From a conceptual perspective, the mechanism of codes 
thus suffers from what we call an ‘opportunity bias’, as a suf-
ficient number of adopters (motivated by expected gains) is 
needed to unfold the pressures described as central to its func-
tioning. In the case of recommendations for gender-diverse 
boards, however, where nominators do not see a sufficient 
opportunity to achieve gains, additional forces must be trig-
gered to ensure compliance. In sum, we can say that political 
goals such as gender equality originating from ethical rather 
than instrumental considerations are unlikely to be effectively 
implemented by means of codes of good governance alone.
Policy Implications: Introduce Specific Targets, 
Threaten to Legislate Quotas
Regulators around the world have turned to mandatory quo-
tas to increase female representation on boards, believing 
voluntary self-regulation to be ineffective (Grosvold et al. 
2007). In this study we have identified ways to improve 
the effectiveness of self-regulation for gender-diverse 
boards that draw on voluntary codes. For policy-makers, 
this implies two potential options to boost the impact of 
self-regulation: First, code issuers may focus on measur-
able outcomes by introducing targets to otherwise unspecific 
recommendations while publicly monitoring their fulfill-
ment. Second, regulators should threaten companies with 
the imposition of mandatory quotas if self-regulation does 
not work. However, both approaches have some limitations:
Targets: Drivers But Also Caps
Our data shows that voluntary self-regulation via a code of 
good governance recommendation is effective when supported 
by specific targets. Such targets may, however, produce an 
unintended dysfunctional effect. While targets usually define 
objectives that should be met as closely as possible, in the case 
of gender diversity, targets set minimum standards that should 
eventually be exceeded in order to achieve gender equality on 
boards (i.e., equal representation of women and men). Equal-
ity requires a balance between women and men of at least 
40:60 (Du Plessis et al. 2014; see also European Commis-
sion 2012). Yet targets for female representation specified in 
national code recommendations usually range between 30 and 
35% (Gabaldon et al. 2017a). Here we can identify a potential 
downside of the binary hit-or-miss logic of targets: As com-
panies strive to meet but not exceed them, they function not 
merely as drivers for gender diversity but also as caps, which 
actually impede gender equality. Clearly, this potential side 
effect must be taken into account when setting gender targets.
The Threat of Legislative Quotas: Credibility is the Key
In our study, we have shown how recommendations in codes 
of good governance are rendered effective by the threat that 
the regulator might impose a mandatory quota. Drawing on 
the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ concept, we argue that such a threat 
only has the potential to impose pressures on nominators when 
credible, i.e., when they believe that the regulator is able and 
willing to legislate if self-regulation fails (Mayntz and Scharpf 
1995; Héritier and Eckert 2008). In our case, the Austrian capi-
tal market accepted that the European Commission as well as 
the Austrian government were both willing and able to intro-
duce mandatory quotas if self-regulation proved ineffective. 
However, there are also limits to this mechanism: It is difficult 
for regulators to keep a threat credible over time, as they have 
to constantly signal their willingness and capacity to deliver.
Limitations of Our Study and Avenues for Future 
Research
It has been shown that the societal demand for gender-diverse 
boards, in particular, and gender equality, in general, have 
increased around the world (Perrault 2015). The particular 
extent, however, varies across countries and cultural contexts 
(Brieger et al. 2019; Gregorič et al. 2017; Grosvold and Bram-
mer 2011; Grosvold et al. 2016). Austria has been described 
as an example of a ‘conservative gender regime’ (Langan and 
Ostner 1991), i.e., a country with a strong welfare-state sys-
tem that nevertheless supports a male-gendered ‘breadwin-
ner’ model (Gresch and Sauer 2018). This results in unequal 
economic participation (World Economic Forum 2017) and 
limited career opportunities for women—a characteristic that 
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Austria shares with many other gender-conservative countries 
such as Germany, France, or Italy (Bambra 2007; Langan and 
Ostner 1991). We believe, therefore, that although derived 
from the single case of Austria, our results provide insights 
into self-regulation for diverse boards in conservative gender 
contexts, in general, as well as in countries that in addition 
share other cultural features of Austria such as the regula-
tory tradition and corporate governance characteristics (e.g., 
Germany), in particular. Furthermore, we are convinced that 
our study implications are also relevant for contexts more 
favorable to gender-diverse boards than Austria: Here, we 
argue, targets and public monitoring as well as the threat of 
legislated quotas will additionally boost the ratio of women 
on boards. Future empirical studies could take a comparative 
cross-country perspective in order to confirm the generaliz-
ability and validity of our implications.
Even with boards becoming more gender-diverse or even 
gender-balanced (sometimes at the expense of other diversity 
dimensions: Gregorič et al. 2017), gender segregation may 
continue in more subtle forms such as in a persistent pay 
gap (Gregory-Smith et al. 2014) or the exclusion of female 
directors from strategically-relevant positions on board sub-
committees (Rebérioux and Roudaut 2017). This can be 
interpreted as a sign that gender disparities do not necessar-
ily disappear through increased female participation; instead 
they shift onto boards where women often hold less powerful 
and prestigious positions than their male co-directors (Har-
rison and Klein 2007). We thus see a need for further empiri-
cal studies to investigate the wider implications of voluntary 
self-regulation on gender equality, i.e., how it contributes to 
a cultural shift and changing gender roles within the board-
room and ‘beyond’ (Bertrand et al. 2019).
Recent literature has emphasized the fact that gender 
diversity on boards, in particular, and gender equality, in 
general, do not result from single measures but rather from 
an interplay of various activities (Brieger et al. 2019; Ian-
notta et al. 2016; Klettner et al. 2016), involving multiple 
actors such as policy-makers, companies, but also the wider 
public (Seierstad et al. 2017; while hardly comparable to 
other regulatory contexts, the UK has been described as 
pursuing such a ‘multi-stakeholder approach’; see Doldor 
2017). While self-regulation via codes of good governance 
has the potential to mobilize a variety of actors and activi-
ties, it nevertheless is merely a single measure whose overall 
impact is limited. Therefore, future research should focus on 
various efforts that, in concert, increase gender diversity.
Conclusion
While scholars have emphasized the potential of self-regu-
lation for gender diversity on boards, many regulators have 
turned to mandatory quotas, believing voluntary codes to be 
ineffective. The aim of our study was to shed light on this 
dilemma. We sought to broaden our conceptual knowledge 
of how codes work in the specific case of gender diversity 
on boards. More specifically, we investigated the conditions 
under which self-regulation via codes can be effective. In 
answering our research question, we expanded recent insti-
tutional-theory perspectives on women on boards to consider 
the topic of self-regulation via codes of good governance. 
We showed that code recommendations in Austria have been 
ineffective unless supported by other forces. In particular, we 
found that the inclusion of specific targets for the proportion 
of female directors and the threat of legislated quotas can 
serve to pressurize nominators, resulting in more gender-
diverse company boards. The contribution of our study to 
the ongoing discourse around women on boards is threefold. 
First, we give an empirical account of the conditions under 
which the self-regulation of gender diversity on boards via 
codes of good governance is effective. Second, we identify 
two potential ways of boosting the impact of voluntary self-
regulation for gender-diverse boards. Third, and perhaps of 
greatest interest, we argue that codes of good governance 
suffer from what we call an ‘opportunity bias’, i.e., their 
underlying mechanisms require a sufficient number of com-
panies to implement a practice because of expected gains, 
thereby initiating pressures on non-adopters. However, this 
is not currently the case regarding gender-diverse boards. 
Therefore, we conclude that political goals such as gender 
equality based on ethical rather than instrumental considera-
tions are unlikely to be effectively implemented by codes 
alone.
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See Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2  Threat as period of intense debate on quota implementation. 
137 newspaper articles on the implementation of mandatory quotas 
were published from 2010 to 2012 by the leading Austrian newspa-
pers Der Standard (left-of-center) and Die Presse (right-of-center)
Table 5  Robustness checks, VIF values and Hausman endogeneity test for the three self-regulations
Negative binomial model One year time lag VIF value
B (s.e.) Exp(B) (95% CI) B (s.e.) Exp(B) (95% CI)
Constant − 2.69 (0.36)** 0.07 (0.03… 0.14) − 2.50 (0.46)** 0.08 (0.03… 0.20)
Recommendation − 0.05 (0.18) 0.96 (0.67… 1.35) − 0.30 (0.22) 0.74 (0.49… 1.14) 3.68
Year 0.13 (0.07)† 1.14 (1.00… 1.30) 0.20 (0.08)* 1.22 (1.04… 1.43) 3.91
Board size 0.04 (0.03) 1.05 (0.98… 1.12) 0.05 (0.03)† 1.05 (1.00… 1.11) 1.47
Company size − 0.06 (0.10) 0.94 (0.78… 1.14) − 0.09 (0.10) 0.92 (0.75… 1.12) 1.52
Board tenure 0.07 (0.04)† 1.07 (1.00… 1.16) − 0.07 (0.04)† 1.07 (1.00… 1.16) 1.21
‘Female’ industry − 0.02 (0.41) 0.98 (0.44… 2.16) 0.22 (0.44) 1.25 (0.53… 2.93) 1.08
Hausman test Random effects model Fixed effects model χ2 value
Recommendation − 0.01 (0.17) .99 (0.71… 1.37) − 0.05 (0.15) 0.95 (0.71… 1.27) 0.20 (p = 0.65)
Negative binomial model One year time lag VIF value
B (s.e.) Exp(B) (95% CI) B (s.e.) Exp(B) (95% CI)
Constant − 1.97 (0.18)** 0.14 (0.10… 0.20) − 1.92 (0.17)** 0.15 (0.11… 0.20)
Targets 0.34 (0.09)** 1.40 (1.17… 1.67) 0.38 (0.12)** 1.47 (1.16… 1.85) 3.90
Year 0.06 (0.03) * 1.06 (1.00… 1.12) 0.07 (0.03) * 1.07 (1.01… 1.13) 5.33
Board size 0.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.97… 1.03) − 0.01 (0.01) 0.99 (0.97… 1.01) 1.22
Company size 0.01 (0.04) 1.01 (0.93… 1.10) − 0.01 (0.04) 0.99 (0.92… 1.07) 1.18
Board tenure − 0.07 (0.03) * 0.93 (0.88… 0.99) − 0.04 (0.03) 0.97 (0.92… 1.02) 2.24
‘Female’ industry 0.27 (0.17) 1.31 (0.93… 1.83) 0.18 (0.16) 1.19 (0.86… 1.64) 1.05
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† p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Table 5  (continued)
Hausman test Random effects model Fixed effects model χ2 value
Targets 0.30.(09)** 1.35 (1.13… 1.62) .30 (0.07)** 1.35 (1.16… 1.57) 0.01 (p = 0.91)
Negative binomial model One year time lag VIF value
B (s.e.) Exp(B) (95% CI) B (s.e.) Exp(B) (95% CI)
Constant − 2.42 (0.27)** 0.09 (0.05… 0.15) − 2.62 (0.31)** 0.07 (0.04… 0.13)
Threat 0.39 (0.18) * 1.48 (1.04… 2.10) .72 (0.27)** 2.05 (1.21… 3.50) 5.16
Year − 0.02 (0.08) 0.98 (0.84… 1.14) − 0.16 (0.12) 0.85 (0.68… 1.07) 5.22
Board size − 0.03 (0.03) 0.97 (0.92… 1.02) − 0.07 (0.03) * 0.93 (0.87… 1.00) 1.76
Company size 0.05 (0.11) 1.05 (0.85… 1.30) 0.07 (0.12) 1.07 (0.85… 1.35) 1.72
Board tenure − 0.14 (0.07)† 0.87 (0.75… 1.00) − 0.14 (0.07) * 0.87 (0.76… 1.00) 1.24
‘Female’ industry − 0.60 (0.35)† 0.55 (0.28… 1.09) − 0.59 (0.38) 0.56 (0.27… 1.16) 1.11
Hausman test Random effects model Fixed effects model χ2 value
Threat 0.48 (0.18)** 1.61 (1.13… 2.29) 0.40 (0.22)† 1.49 (0.97… 2.28) 0.41 (p = 0.52)
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